Abstract. We present a study of the concrete complexity of solving instances of the unique shortest vector problem (uSVP). In particular, we study the complexity of solving the Learning with Errors (LWE) problem by reducing the Bounded-Distance Decoding (BDD) problem to uSVP and attempting to solve such instances using the 'embedding' approach. We experimentally derive a model for the success of the approach, compare to alternative methods and demonstrate that for the LWE instances considered in this work, reducing to uSVP and solving via embedding compares favorably to other approaches.
Introduction
The Learning with Errors (LWE) problem is a generalisation to large moduli of the Learning Parity with Noise (LPN) problem. Since introduction by Regev [20] , it has proved a remarkably flexible base for building cryptosystems. For example, Gentry, Peikert and Vaikuntanathan presented in [11] LWE-based constructions of identity-based encryption and many recent (fully) homomorphic encryption constructions are related to LWE [10, 7, 2] . Besides the flexibility of LWE, the main reason for the popularity of this problem is the convincing theoretical arguments underlying its hardness, namely a reduction from worst-case lattice problems such as GapSVP and SIVP to averagecase LWE.
Definition 1 (LWE [20] ). Let n, q be positive integers, χ be a probability distribution on Z and s be a secret vector following the uniform distribution on Z n q . We denote by L s,χ the probability distribution on Z n q × Z q obtained by choosing a from the uniform distribution on Z n q , choosing e ∈ Z according to χ and returning (a, c) = (a, a, s +e) ∈ Z n q × Z q . The LWE problem is then, given a set of samples, to determine whether they originated from a L s,χ oracle for some s or whether they follow the uniform distribution on Z n q × Z q .
The modulus is typically taken to be polynomial in n and χ is the discrete Gaussian on D Z,α·q on Z with mean 0 and standard deviation σ = α · q/ √ 2π for some α. For these choices it was shown in [21, 6] that if αq > 2 √ n then (worst-case) GapSVP-Õ(n/α) reduces to (average-case) LWE.
However, while the asymptotic hardness of LWE is well-understood, current understanding of the concrete hardness of solving particular instances of LWE leaves much to be desired. In this work, we examine the applicability of Kannan's embedding technique [13] to LWE and present the results of experiments using LLL and BKZ. While the embedding approach has been successfully employed in several past works, the approach remains somewhat mysterious with our current understanding of the efficacy of the approach being comparatively poor.
Related Work
In [16] Liu et. al. investigate similar questions, though their work falls short of providing answers to the question of how this approach compares to other approaches for LWE and provides no experimental results which, in our opinion, form an indispensable component of any such work, given the current state of knowledge regarding the concrete complexity of unique-SVP. Specifically, in [16] , an attempt is made to quantify the size of λ 2 /λ 1 gap we can obtain by constructing embedding lattices from LWE instances. However, the current understanding of how a particular gap is related to the success of a particular reduction algorithm in disclosing a shortest vector, is poor. In [9] the results of a number of experiments were reported in which the authors examined the success of a number of algorithms in disclosing a shortest vector when (at least) a good approximation to the gap was known (though not in bounded-distance decoding/LWE cases). A simple model was proposed as a criterion for the success of a particular algorithm and particular class of lattices, with 'explaining the uSVP phenomenon' being posed as an open question. The work of [16] , in contrast, attempts to quantify the gap with good probability, which is relatively easy, but then makes no attempt to determine how the size of a particular gap is related to the success of a particular lattice-basis reduction algorithm in disclosing a shortest non-zero vector which, in our view, is the primary question that such a work must strive to answer. In Appendix A we re-visit some claims made in [16] and demonstrate them to be erroneous.
Contribution & Organisation
We provide some background in Section 2 and discuss the embedding gap in Section 3.1. In Section 4 we apply the embedding approach to lattices derived from LWE instances and discuss the limits of this approach. Finally, in Section 5 we discuss the limits of the embedding approach and compare our results with results from the literature.
Background and Notation

Lattices and Discrete Gaussians
A lattice Λ in R m is a discrete additive subgroup. We view a lattice as being generated by a (non-unique) basis
The rank of the lattice L(B) is defined to be the rank of the matrix B with rows consisting of the basis vectors. If m = n we say that L(B) is full-rank. We are only concerned with such lattices in this work and henceforth assume that the lattices we deal with are full-rank. In addition, in this work we are only concerned with q-ary lattices which are those such that qZ m ⊆ Λ ⊆ Z m . Note that every q-ary lattice is full-rank.
Given a lattice Λ we denote by λ i (Λ) the i-th minimum of Λ:
The determinant det(L) of a full-rank lattice is the absolute value of the determinant of any basis of the lattice.
Throughout, we work exclusively in the Euclidean norm unless otherwise stated and omit norm subscripts i.e. x = x 2 . Given a point t ∈ R m and a lattice Λ, we define the minimum distance from t to the lattice by dist(t, Λ) = min { t − x | x ∈ Λ}.
The following are some computational problems on lattices which will be of relevance to our discussion
output the lattice vector y closest to t --Unique Shortest Vector Problem ( -uSVP): Given a lattice L such that λ 2 (L) > · λ 1 (L), find the shortest non-zero lattice vector in L Now, if we have an algorithm which can solve Hermite-SVP with approximation factor κ, we can use this algorithm linearly many times [17] to solve Approx-SVP with approximation factor κ 2 . Hence, we can use our κ-HSVP algorithm to solve uSVP instances in which the gap is at least κ 2 . Similarly, if we have a Hermite root factor δ 0 characterising our Hermite-SVP algorithm, we can solve uSVP instances of gap δ 2m 0 . However, one of the conclusions from [9] , as we discuss later, is that, as with the gulf between the theoretical and practical performance of lattice reduction algorithms, we can generally solve uSVP instances with much smaller gap. More specifically, the results of [9] indicate that, while an exponential gap is still required to solve uSVP, the size of the gap only needs to grow on the order of the Hermite factor rather than its square, as indicated by the theoretical (worst-case) results. To the best of our knowledge, this behaviour remains unexplained and the practical performance of lattice reduction algorithms on lattices possessing a λ 2 /λ 1 gap remains somewhat mysterious.
We always start counting from zero and denote vectors and matrices in lower-case and upper-case bold, respectively. We always assume that a lattice is generated by row combinations and that, when treating a collection of LWE samples as a 'matrix-LWE' sample, we assume this takes the form b = A T s + e. Given a random variable X, E[X] denotes the expected value of X.
All experiments were carried out using the NTL implementation of BKZ and all LWE instances were generated using the LWE instance generator [3] . For simplicity, we assume throughout that enough LWE samples are exposed by a cryptosystem to allow the employment of the embedding technique in the optimal lattice dimension.
The discrete Gaussian distribution with parameter s, denoted D Λ,s , over a lattice Λ is defined to be the probability distribution with support Λ which, for each x ∈ Λ, assigns probability proportional to exp(−π x 2 /s 2 ). When we refer to the value s in this work with regard to LWE instantiations, we mean a discrete Gaussian with parameter s over the integer lattice. In an abuse of notation, we also use D Λ,s to denote a random variable following this distribution.
The following tail bound on discrete Gaussians from [5] is needed:
2 )/2) < 1. Then for any real s > 0 and any integer n ≥ 1 we have
The Concrete Complexity of BKZ and BKZ 2.0
A central difficulty which arises in all works which require the use of 'strong' lattice reduction (by which we mean BKZ and improved variants) is the prediction of the concrete complexity of such algorithms. In [8] the authors present a study of 'BKZ 2.0', the amalgamation of three folklore techniques to improve the performance of BKZ: pruned enumeration; pre-processing of local blocks and early termination. While no implementations of such algorithms are publicly available, the authors of [8] present a simulator to predict the behaviour of out-of-reach BKZ computations. In [14] a model for the running time of BKZ 2.0 is proposed by running a limited set of experiments using the standard NTL implementation of BKZ and then adjusting the extrapolated running times by a certain factor to try and account for the improved running times promised by BKZ 2.0. The model arrived at is
In a recent work [15] , the authors re-visit this model and compare the predictions to the BKZ 2.0 simulator of [8] in a few cases. In the cases examined in [15] , the running-time predictions obtained by the use of the BKZ 2.0 simulator are quite close to those obtained by the model of Lindner and Peikert.
However, based on the data-points provided in [15] and converting these to the same metric as in the Lindner-Peikert model, the function log 2 T
provides a close approximation to the running-time output of the simulator for these particular cases.
This is a non-linear approximation and hence naturally grows faster than the approximation in [14] . However, given the greater sophistication of the latter 'BKZ 2.0' extrapolations derived from the simulator of [8] , we expect this model to provide more accurate approximations of running times than the model of [14] .
We note that a BKZ logarithmic running-time model which is non-linear in log 2 δ 0 appears more intuitive than a linear model. While, in practise, the root Hermite factors achievable through the use of BKZ with a particular blocksize β are much better than their best provable upper bounds, the root factor achievable appears to behave similarly to the upper bounds as a function of β. Namely, the best proven upper bounds on the root Hermite factor are of the form √ γ β 1/(β−1) , where γ β denotes the best known upper bound on the Hermite constant for lattices of dimension β. Now since, asymptotically, γ β grows linearly in β, if we assume that the root Hermite factor achievable in practise displays asymptotic behaviour similar to that of the best-known upper bound, then the root Hermite factor achievable as a function of β, denoted δ 0 (β), is such that δ 0 (β) ∈ Ω(1/β). Since the running time of BKZ appears to be doubly-exponential in β, we can derive that log T sec is non-linear in 1/ log δ 0 , as is borne out by the results in [15] . In Section 4, we employ both models for completeness and comparison.
Alternative Algorithms for Solving LWE
Several previous works examine algorithms for solving LWE instances. The main methods for solving LWE consist of 1. Using combinatorial methods or lattice reduction to find a short (scaled) dual-lattice vector, permitting to distinguish LWE samples from uniform [19, 1] 2. Employing lattice reduction on the primal lattice then employing Babai's nearest-plane algorithm or a decoding variant thereof [14, 15] 3. Reduce the problem to noise-free non-linear polynomial system solving as proposed by Arora and Ge [4] .
While, asymptotically, combinatorial methods for finding short (scaled) dual-lattice vectors are most efficient even for moderate parameter sizes [1] , the exponential space requirements of these algorithms imply that lattice-based methods are more suitable for attacking practical instantiations of LWE. The algorithm due to Arora and Ge, at present, is largely of theoretical interest and impractical in its current form.
Concrete Hardness of uSVP
It is folklore that the presence of a significant gap between the first and second minima of a lattice makes finding the a shortest non-zero vector somewhat easier than would otherwise be the case, with an exponential gap allowing a shortest non-zero vector to be disclosed by application of LLL. However, in cases with sub-exponential gap, the success of lattice reduction algorithms in disclosing shortest non-zero vectors is poorly understood with a brief investigation in [9] being (to the best of our knowledge) the only practical investigation of such effects.
In [9] it was posited that given a lattice-reduction algorithm which we assume to be characterised by a root-Hermite factor δ 0 and a (full-rank) m-dimensional lattice Λ, the algorithm will be successful in disclosing a shortest non-zero vector with high probability when λ 2 (Λ)/λ 1 (Λ) ≥ τ · δ m 0 , where τ was taken to be a constant depending both on the nature of the lattices examined and also on the lattice reduction algorithm applied. In [9] values of τ ranging between 0.18 and 0.48 were experimentally-derived for various classes of lattices (though not LWE-derived lattices) and algorithms. However, the phrase 'with high probability' was not elaborated on in [9] and thus it is unclear as to whether a fixed threshold was used throughout the experiments in [9] or a variable threshold.
Construction of Embedding Lattices
We consider the problem of being given an m-dimensional LWE-derived lattice basis A derived from LWE samples as follows. We take a sample matrix A ∈ Z n×m q and calculate the reduced echelon form A ∈ Z n×m q . For the right permutation matrix P ∈ Z m×m , we obtain the form A · P = I A with I ∈ Z n×n q and A ∈ Z (m−n)×(m−n) q . If we interpret this matrix as a matrix over Z, extend it with qI ∈ Z (m−n)×(m−n) and define
A is a basis of the lattice {v ∈ Z m | ∃x ∈ Z q n : xA = v mod q}. Now, given this A and a target vector t ∈ Z m q and attempting to solve the LWE instance by reducing the embedding lattice basis
where t > 0 is an embedding factor to be determined. We then define Λ e := L(B). Note that, with overwhelming probability, det(Λ e ) = t · q m−n , i.e. A has full rank over Z q .
It is well-known [18] that 1/(2γ)-BDD can be reduced to solving γ-USVP by setting the embedding factor t ≥ dist(t, L(A)). In practise, however, employing a smaller embedding factor generally allows us to create a unique-SVP instance with larger λ 2 /λ 1 gap than by setting t = dist(t, L(A)). However, by setting t < dist(t, L(A)), with non-zero probability there exists a vector
where c ∈ Z and, in general,
. Thus when we reduce t, quantification of the resulting λ 2 /λ 1 gap becomes difficult.
To the best of our knowledge, no good model exists to determine the distribution of the lattice gap when taking an embedding factor smaller than e -an attempt is made in [16] but fails for reasons we outline in Appendix A.
To attempt circumvention of such difficulties, we conduct experiments on LWE-derived uSVP lattices, examining firstly the λ 2 /λ 1 gap required for success when we set t = dist(t, L(A)) (where we know λ 2 /λ 1 ) and then for the case t = 1, under the assumption that the 'necessary gap' is unlikely to change, allowing us to derive analogous models.
On the Determination of τ when t = e
As mentioned in 2.4, we employ the simple model of Gama and Nguyen for predicting the success of a particular basis-reduction algorithm in recovering a shortest non-zero vector, namely that there exist values of τ such that, for a given probability, basis-reduction algorithm and lattice class, the basis-reduction algorithm finds a shortest non-zero vector with probability greater or equal than the given probability over the random choice of lattices in the class whenever
0 where Λ represents a random choice of lattice in the class with dimension m. Thus, if we are able to sample such lattices randomly, determining a particular value of τ requires us to know (at least approximately) the λ 2 /λ 1 gap of the lattices we are dealing with.
In the q-ary lattices we consider (i.e. lattices of the form L(A)), unfortunately, there is no known good bound (in the Euclidean norm) on the first minimum when m < 5n log 2 q. The case of m ≥ 5n log 2 q is dealt with in [22] . In [16] , the authors attempt to prove a probabilistic lower-bound for smaller m in the Euclidean norm, however the arguments employed in the attempted proof are inadequate -we revisit these in Appendix A. For the case of random lattices (in the sense of [12] ), it is known that with overwhelming probability the minima of such an n-dimensional lattice are all asymptotically close to the Gaussian heuristic i.e.
Now the q-ary lattices (e.g. L(A)) widely employed in lattice-based cryptography are not random in this sense, being instead 'Ajtai' or LWE lattices, endowed with the worst-to-average-case properties. However, in all cases, it appears that the Gaussian heuristic appears to hold exceedingly well for such lattices (at least for the first minimum and with the added property that we always have vectors of norm q within the lattice), thus we assume throughout that the first minimum of such lattices is lower-bounded by the Gaussian heuristic with overwhelming probability.
For the first minimum of the embedded lattices, we only deal with this explicitly in the 'known-λ 1 ' case where we take this to be λ 1 (Λ e ) = √ 2 · e .
Then we can state the following lemma
, let s > 0 and let c > 1. Let e be drawn from D Z m ,s . Under the assumption that λ 1 (Λ(A)) ≥ GH q,n,m 1 and that the rows of A are linearly-independent over Z q , we can create an embedding lattice Λ e with λ 2 /λ 1 -gap greater than min q,
Proof. Omitted
We wish to obtain the value of m for which we can expect to gain the largest gaps (again, probabilistically).
Corollary 1.
Under the assumptions stated in Lemma 2 and for a fixed value of c (c > 1), we can construct embedding lattices with the largest possible gap when
Proof. We assume that the approximation is close enough such that the maximum occurs for the same value of m. Consider the functions:
where c > 1, s > 0.
-f 1 (m) = Thus, in our experiments, it appears valid to derive values of τ by assuming the Gaussian heuristic holds and that the (Euclidean) norm of the noise vector is equal to the expected value.
On the Determination of τ when t < e
However, as mentioned, the employment of an embedding factor smaller than the norm of the noise vector e generally leads to a modest decrease in the size of the second minimum of the resulting lattice. In all cases observed, however, this decrease in the second minimum is less than the corresponding decrease in the first minimum (as a result of making the target vector shorter), leading to a more effective attack. However, quantification of the resulting gap is not simple -we know of no efficient method for determining the distribution of the λ 2 /λ 1 gap under such conditions.
In an attempt to circumvent the lack of knowledge of the distribution of the λ 2 /λ 1 gap when we take an embedding factor t such that t < e , we assume that (for the same probabilistic success of a given basis-reduction algorithm) the same size of gap is required as in the case where we take t = e and then derive a modified value for τ . That is, we assume that the basis-reduction algorithm is in some sense oblivious to the embedding factor, with the size of the gap being the 'deciding' factor. While this is a somewhat arbitrary assumption, we believe it to be reasonable and intuitive. We denote the value of τ when t = e by τ e and the analogous value of τ when t = 1 by τ 1 . Given a particular value of n and knowing τ e , we hence know (approximately) the gap required, denoted by g e and hence a corresponding minimum lattice dimension which we denote by m e . Then, denoting by m 1 the minimum lattice dimension in the case t = 1 and assuming that the minimum required gap, denoted g 1 in the second case is the same, we can write
However, for easier and more intuitive comparison, we wish to express τ values for the case t = 1 when using the gaps from the t = e cases. For this comparison, we simply use the λ 2 /λ 1 gaps from the case t = e and plug in the minimum dimension values from the case t = 1. We denote these 'illustrative' values of τ by τ .
Application to LWE and comparisons
We now examine in more detail the model of [9] when applied to such unique-SVP instances. One difficulty with this model is that, while Gama and Nguyen state that success will occur with 'high probability', this probability is not explained. In the cases examined in this work, it appears to be often impossible to exceed a success probability and forms, in our opinion, an interesting subject for future work. For instance, Figure 1 demonstrates success probabilities for LLL for the case of Regev's parameterisation with n ∈ {35, 40, 45} (t = e ) and increasing values of m, with between 50 and 100 cases being run for each value of m. We treat only the LWE parameterisations proposed by Regev [21] and Lindner/Peikert [14] and view each family of LWE instances as being parameterised by a value of n, from which values of s and q are derived. We then wish to examine the conditions under which applying the embedding approach yields a basis in which the target vector is present (though not necessarily the shortest vector in this reduced basis).
As in [9] , our experiments indicate that the target vector lies in the reduced basis with some (fixed) probability whenever the gap is large enough such that
where τ is some real constant such that 0 < τ ≤ 1 depending on the desired probability level, the 'nature' of the lattices considered and the basis-reduction algorithm used. Our experiments proceed by fixing values of n to obtain corresponding LWE parameterisations then generating instances with increasing values of m -using [3] until finding the minimum such value that recovery of the target vector is possible with the desired probability. We denote such values of m by m min (n). In the t = e case, plugging this value m min (n) in
0 for m where we use Lemma 2 then recovers τ e . From this value and experimental data for t = 1 we can then derive
(m e −m1) 0 , 1 and τ by solving
0 . Throughout, the experimental data points indicate the minimum lattice dimension for which the lattice basis reduction algorithm succeeds in recovering the target vector with success rate 10%. In all experiments carried out, we artificially force that every e takes value ≈ E[ e ]. This allows us to gain a good estimate of the λ 2 /λ 1 gap in the t = e case. In addition, for the m min calculations, we used the experimentallyderived root Hermite factors (see Appendix B) with linear interpolation.
Regev's Parameters
We firstly examine the case of Regev's original parameters as proposed in [20] . We take q ≈ n 2 and set α = 1/( √ n · log analogous plots in the case t = 1, using the 'illustrative' values of τ mentioned in Section 3.3. Figure 4 gives the m e /m 1 ratio for LLL and BKZ-5, illustrating the greater efficiency of using t = 1.
Based on the results as displayed above, we obtain parameters for embedding factors of e and 1, given in Table 1 . We note that, while using an embedding factor t = 1 is most efficient, obtaining τ 1 > τ e possibly seems counter-intuitive. However, the assumption of a fixed gap required for success while success occurs for a smaller value of m indeed leads to a larger value for τ 1 . Table 1 . Parameters for finding e with success rate 10%, Regev's parameterisation.
Lindner and Peikert's Parameters
In [14] , parameters for an improved LWE-based cryptosystem were proposed. For more details on this variant, the reader is refered to [14] . For our purposes, the principal difference from the Regev-LWE case is the smaller moduli employed by Lindner and Peikert. As in the Regev-LWE case, we choose a series of values for n and generate parameters accordingly, then apply LLL, BKZ-5 and BKZ-10 to solve such instances as far as is possible. Specifically, Table 2 gives a selection of the parameters considered as produced by [3] . We proceed similarly to the Regev-LWE case, with minimum lattice dimensions being given in Figure 5 for the t = e case and in Figure 6 for the t = 1 case. Table 3 gives the derived values of τ for Lindner and Peikert's parameterisation. Table 3 . Parameters for finding e with success rate 10%, Lindner and Peikert's parameters
We note that the values of τ derived seem consistent and do not vary widely between parameterisations. Of course, the value of τ may be expected to change when using 'stronger' algorithms than BKZ-10 or BKZ-20, however our limited experiments, and the results reported in [9] appear to indicate that the use of 'stronger' basis reduction algorithms leads to modest decreases in the values of τ . Thus, when we project these results in Section 5.1, we use the experimentally-derived τ values and thus expect the resulting complexity predictions to be somewhat conservative.
Limits of the Embedding Approach
Using the above model, we can derive an estimation of the limits of applicability of the embedding approach. Given a values (δ 0 , τ ), we can define the maximum value of n for which we can recover the target vector using the embedding approach to be
The goal is to determine the values of n max . Lemma 2 shows that we can construct a gap of size (under the assumption that we use basis-reduction algorithms with δ 0 small enough that q
cs .
If we want to solve an LWE instance with secret-dimension n, we have to find m such that
In order to determine the optimal m, we want to maximize the function
the first derivative of which is zero only when n log q m 2 = log δ 0 , and therefore m = n log q log δ0 is the optimal sub-dimension. In other words, we expect the attack to succeed if
Thus, we only need to consider the optimal sub-dimension to ascertain whether we can expect the attack to succeed (with the given probability). Since, in our experiments we force e ≈ E[ e ], we increase the value of c to cover all but the upper-tail of the distribution of e . We can then state the following:
Assumption 1 Given a fixed LWE parameterisation and a given value of τ (derived as above using e ≈ E[ e ] instances and also corresponding to a fixed δ 0 ) corresponding to a fixed success rate p s , we can solve general instances from the parameterisation with secret-dimension n with a particular value of m with probability
We note that this assumption follows immediately from the above discussion and Lemma 1. Thus, given a target success probability, we attempt to satisfy conditions 1 and 2.
Comparisons
We briefly compare the application of BKZ in both the embedding approach and the short dual-lattice vector distinguishing approach. For all embedding approach predictions, we take success probability slightly lower than n δ0 log 2 (sec) = 1.8/ log 2 δ0 − 110 log 2 (sec) = 0.009/ log Table 4 . Estimated cost of finding e with success rate 0.099, Regev's parameters.
0.1, employing Assumption 1 -we choose c such that condition 1 holds for p c ≥ 0.099. While the dual-lattice distinguishing approach is not the best-known attack (the best practical attacks being that in [14] or modified versions [15] ), it is easy to analyse in comparison to reduction-then-decode algorithms. We consider the application of BKZ in both situations. In the distinguishing approach, we can choose a desired distinguishing advantage and set γ = q/s· ln(1/ )/π, from which we can compute a required Hermite root factor of δ 0 = 2 log 2 2 (γ)/(4n log 2 q) . So, for instance, with n = 128, we require δ 0 ≈ 1.0077 to gain a distinguishing advantage of ≈ 0.099, i.e. significantly worse than the 1.0085 required for the embedding attack. In Table 5 we give comparable estimated costs for distinguishing between LWE samples and uniformly random samples using the approach of Micciancio and Regev. However, we note that the expression of Lindner and Peikert for the advantage of the dual-lattice distinguishing approach gives an upper-bound on the advantage obtained through the use of a specific algorithm. While the approximation is close overall, in the high-advantage regime the model is somewhat optimistic in estimating the advantage obtainable.
More rigourous comparison to the dual-lattice distinguishing attack is difficult, however, since the optimal strategy for said attack is to run a large number of low-advantage attacks and we can only analyse the embedding approach for high-advantages due to the (current) practical component of the analysis. We also note that if the embedding approach is used with t = e and fails, we can extract the resulting reduced basis of the lattice Λ and can then we proceed to run enumeration/decoding procedures, a strategy worthy of further investigation.
In conclusion, we provide evidence that the model of Gama and Nguyen is applicable to the solution of unique-SVP instances constructed from LWE instances and experimentally derive the constants which embody the performance of the approach. Based on the models used and assumptions made, we show that the embedding approach outperforms the dual-lattice distinguishing approach of Micciancio and Regev (in the high-advantage regime).
Open Questions We view a more in-depth comparison of the efficiency of the embedding technique and enumeration techniques as a pressing research question. The practical behaviour of lattice-reduction algorithms on unique-SVP instances remains mysterious, with (to the best of our knowledge) no recent progress in explaining the phenomena observed.
A On Theorem 1 in [16] In Theorem 1 in [16] it is claimed that by choosing any positive real number ε it is possible to create an embedding lattice with λ 2 /λ 1 gap greater than
where, in [16] , R essentially represents the Gaussian heuristic.
The authors of [16] claim that setting the embedding factor β = ε 2 αq m 2π leads to the resulting embedding lattice possessing such a gap with high probability.
The authors of [16] proceed to consider those members of the embedding lattice y = (a + jt, jβ) such that y ≤ R. The family of sets W j := {y ∈ L : y = (a + jt, jβ), a ∈ L, y ≤ R} is then defined and then it is claimed that
However, the arguments underlying such claims rely on Lemma 3 in [16] in which it is claimed that, if we consider the set V = a ∈ Z m q : a ≤ R , the cardinality of V is the same as the number of integer points in the closed Euclidean m-dimensional ball of radius R. This, however, ignores the issue that no notion of Euclidean norm exists in Z m q .
Treating rigorously the claims made in [16] is beyond the scope of the current work and of limited interest.
B Root-Hermite Factors for LWE-derived Lattices
It is a generally-accepted heuristic that the norms of shortest lattice vectors found by lattice basis reduction algorithms can be approximated by 
